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istration. Failure to give such advice may expose clients to unhappy
results and lawyers to considerable criticism from clients.
We in Ontario are moving towards an era of more complicated
and legalistic collective bargaining agreements.
Martin L. Levinson-=
LIABILITY OF STOREKEEPERS TO PERSONS WHO COME
ONTO THE PREMISES TO BUY Once a shop is open for
business the shopkeeper is potentially liable for injuries suffered by
customers while on his premises.
First, he is responsible for negligent acts committed either by
himself or his servants in the course of their employment. Secondly,
he is liable as the occupier of property for injuries caused by defects
in the premises themselves. It is with this second aspect of his
responsibility that this article is specifically concerned.
The general principles of negligence do not apply to the occupier
of property. There is not one single standard of reasonable care
the breach of which results in an obligation to all persons injured
because of such negligence. Instead, we find a complex set of rules
which classifies persons entering property in accordance with their
business interests. Once persons are classified, a corresponding duty
is imposed on the occupier on an ascending scale from a nominal
duty towards a trespasser to the more onerous duty toward a
person invited to the premises for a legitimate business reason.,
This judicial approach was strongly criticized by Denning L.J. (as
he then was) in Dunster v. Abbott,2 where he remarked:
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a
trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until youdo business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have done business
with him, it seems rather strange that your duty towards him shouldbe different when he comes up to your door from what it is when he
goes away.
He further observed that the system was too rigid, resulting
either in injustice in borderline cases or the expansion of existing
categories to meet cases falling clearly within the accepted areas.
However, in the case of White v. Imperial Optical,3 Barlow J.
recently reaffirmed that the categories of invitee, licensee and tres-
passer remain the basis of defining an occupier's liability in the
Province of Ontario.
*Mr. Levinson is in the Fourth Year at Osgoode Hall Law School. Thispaper was presented to the Labour Relations Section of the Ontario Bar
on February 5, 1960.
I Robt. Addle & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [19291 A.C. 358.
2 [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572.
3 (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 496 (Ont.).
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Persons entering a shop may be either licensees, whom the
shopkeeper merely permits to be there, or invitees who enter for
a valid business reason. To the former, the shopkeeper owes only
the duty to warn of hidden dangers of which he is, in fact, aware,
but to the latter he owes a higher duty based on the apparent
economic benefit he is likely to derive from such a visit A bona fide
customer is an invitee who is expressly or impliedly invited to enter
the store in order to do business with the occupier and, according
to Indermaur v. Dames,4 the authoritative decision in this branch
of the law, it is this alleged invitation coupled with the potential
benefit to the occupier which is the governing factor for the imposi-
tion of such a high duty on the storekeeper.
In his article Business Visitors and Invitees5 Dean William L.
Prosser disagrees with the notion of implied invitation as the basis
of the storekeeper's liability. He is averse to this view that the
occupier owes a duty to the "invitee", or the American counterpart,
"the business visitor", because of the apparent economic benefit he
will receive. In contrast, having examined the cases prior to Inder-
maur v. Dames, he finds that the courts have emphasized that the
storekeeper "holds out" to the general public that his premises are
safe for the purpose for which they are open, without reference to
the potential profit. If this second test were used, it would not be
so difficult for the courts to decide who was using the shop in rela-
tion to the business and who was in the store for purely personal
purposes. Further, since the shopkeeper holds out that his premises
are reasonably safe for the purposes for which they are open, there
is a general duty on him to keep them safe. With modern develop-
ments in insurance protection this would seem to be a practical
business approach. Dean Prosser does not eliminate the categories;
he merely changes the method of classification, imposing a positive
duty on the occupier to keep his premises reasonably safe for those
persons who enter the shop for purposes related to his business.
Returning to the authority of past decisions, one finds that the
Canadian courts have extended the class of "invitee" to such a point
that it covers nearly as great a segment of the public as that sug-
gested by Dean Prosser on the basis of "holding out" although the
route has been of a more devious nature. A person visiting a shop
need not make a purchase in order to become an invitee; it is enough
if he enters with the mental prospect of making a purchase.6 For
example, in the case of Taylor v. Alexander it was held that a person
who went to a shop on business and returned later to retrieve an
article which he had previously left behind was an invitee on the
return visit.7 Also, those who take advantage of free services offered
by a store in the interests of advertising or goodwill are also classed
4 (1866), L.R. 1 C.P. 274.
5 (1942), 20 Can. Bar Rev. 357.
6 Benardz v. Burgess, [1937] O.W.N. 497.
7 Taylor vi. Alexander, [1935] O.R. 406.
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as invitees and are given the added protection of this category.
Thus a person stopping to put air in the tires of his car would be
an invitee of the garage operator. In short, most adult persons
visiting a shop would be classed as invitees except where it can be
proved that they came for purely personal reasons, as for example,
to visit an employee therein, to take a short cut through the store or
to use the premises as protection from the rain.
An interesting illustration of how far the courts have extended
this concept of "invitee" is found in cases of injury to children who
have accompanied an adult on a shopping expedition. Obviously,
infants are not themselves potential customers, but Quillian J.
summed up the attitude of the American courts in such circumstances
as follows8 :
Not only is it customary for small children to be carried into stores,
bakeries and similar shops but it is done in connection with the pro-
prietor's business, because the patronage of the parents depends upon
the privilege of bringing children .... That the custom is recognized by
merchants is conclusively shown by the devices designed for the amuse-
ment of children generally found in the stores.
Canadian courts appear to take a similar view although we cannot
find it expressed in such unequivocal language. In Sangster v. T.
Eaton Co.9 it was found that the duty set forth in Indermaur v.
Dames applied to a child two and one-half years old who accom-
panied his mother to a store and was injured by a wall mirror-which
had accidentally fallen. It should be noted that the mother took the
child to the store in order to purchase clothes for him from which
act it might be inferred there was an economic benefit in his coming.
However, in Hudson's Bay Company v. Wyrzykowslci l o Hudson J.
referred to the Sangster case holding that the principles of Inder-
maur v. Dames applied "in the case of a small child accompanying
its mother in a department store" without making reference to the
purpose of their visit. These cases suggest that children accompany-
ing an adult will be classed as customers and that the category of
"invitee" has been stretched to its very limits to accommodate
modern social customs.
Now that customers have been classified as invitees, what then
is ,the duty imposed upon the shopkeeper towards said invitees?
Professor Prosser suggested it should be that of keeping the premises
reasonably safe for the purposes for which the store is open. How-
ever, the standard of care actually applied has been authoritively
stated by Willes J. in Indermaur v. Dames:11
s Cooper v. Anderson, 101 S.E. 909 (1920).
9 (1893), 25 O.R. 78.
10 [1938J S.C.R. 278.
11 Supra, footnote 4, at p. 288.
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And, with respect to such a visitor at least, we consider it settled law,
that he, using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled
to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to
prevent damage from unusual danger of which he knows or ought to
know; and that, where there is evidence of neglect, the question of
whether such reasonable care has been taken by notice, lighting, guard-
ing, or otherwise, and whether there was contributory negligence in the
sufferer, must be determined by a jury as a matter of fact.
Although this statement is still accepted as the standard of care
required of the invitor, subsequent cases indicate it is somewhat
ambiguous on practical application. In practice, there are two prim-
ary considerations.
First, the plaintiff customer must prove that his injury was
caused by some negligence on the part of the shopkeeper. It was
held in Lastiwka v. Shymka 2 that where the plaintiff, invitee, fails
to prove that the storekeeper was negligent there is no liability on
the occupier even though injury occurs while the invitee is shopping
on the premises of the defendant.
This principle was applied in Noble v. Hudson's Bay Co.13 where the
plaintiff who entered the defendant company's store on a snowy day,
slipped and broke her ankle on a floor which was covered with cinders
and melting snow. The defendant proved the floor had been cleaned
on the morning in question and that he employed a janitor whose
duty it was to keep the floors at the entrances clean. In this case
the court held that the plaintiff had not satisfied the onus on her
of showing that the defendant had failed to use reasonable care to
make his premises safe for invitees. To have held otherwise would
have been to infer that the defendant was under an obligation to
keep the floor clean despite a snow storm from which customers
came in at the rate of one every twelve seconds-obviously an un-
reasonable degree of care in the circumstances.
Secondly, once negligence has been proved the court must still
decide if it was in relation to some "unusual danger" about the
premises, of which the shopkeeper knew or ought to have known.
The standard is that of the reasonable and prudent shopkeeper and
thus the plaintiff in Openshaw v. Loukes'14 failed to recover for in-
juries sustained when she slipped while shopping in the defendant's
store. In falling, she struck a class show case, breaking the glass and
severing a nerve in her arm. After the court had found no negli-
ence by the defendant in relation to the condition of the floors on
which the plantiff slipped, it concluded that a shopkeeper was not
legally bound to use in his show cases glass of such strength as
would resist the force of a shopper falling against it.
Even so, the word "unusual" defies a comprehensive definition
because it relates not only to the superior knowledge of the property
imputed to the invitor, but also to what the invitee might expect, or
12 (1945), 1 W.W.R. 529 (Alta.).
13 [1947] 1 D.L.R. 387 (Alta.).
14 (1957), 21 W.W.R. 378 (B.C.).
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in fact knows, about the condition of the premises. The customer
is expected to take reasonable care to avoid obvious dangers and
if he chooses to take a chance then the shopkeeper is not liable
for any injuries so incurred. Consequently, whether or not the
defect amounts to an unusual danger must be decided as a matter
of fact in each case. With regard thereto, structural defects in a
building are considered unusual dangers as are foreign materials
found on the floor of a store. Thus in Diederichs v. Metropolitan
Stores Ltd.15 the plaintiff recovered against the defendant shopkeeper
when she slipped on a plastic trinket which had fallen from a counter.
Other cases indicate that the operators of fruit and vegetable stores
must exercise extreme care to prevent vegetable matter from remain-
ing on the floors where it might cause injury to a customer. On the
other hand it may be inferred from Carroll & Carroll v. Chicken
Palace Ltd.16 where a blind customer failed to recover for injuries
sustained, that although the shopkeeper invites the general public
including the infirm as well as the physically fit to enter his store,
he need not take special precautions to prevent injury to handicapped
persons.
According to Willes J., the duty of the shopkeeper is to prevent
damage from unusual danger and there is no general duty to prevent
the unusual danger itself. He has the alternative of either keeping
the premises reasonably free from unusual danger or giving adequate
protection to invitees against such dangers of which he knows or
ought to know by means of lighting devices, guarding, etc. This
view was recently affirmed by Lord Porter in London Graving Dock
v. Horton17 where he held that an invitee cannot require the occupier
to make alterations to his premises in order to render them safe.
He must take them as they are, subject to the occupier's duty to
use reasonable care to protect him from unusual dangers. Such a
conclusion means that the existing law differs from the contention
of Professor Prosser that the shopkeeper "holds out" to the public
that his premises are reasonably safe for the purposes for which
they are opened to the public.
Whether the invitor has taken reasonable precautions to pro-
tect his customers from existing dangers is again a question of fact
to be decided in each case. However, it was further laid down in
London Graving Docks v. Horton that a warning as to existence of
the danger is enough to discharge the duty placed on the shopkeeper.
Where the invitee has been forewarned of the nature of the danger
by the shopkeeper, or has otherwise obtained knowledge of it, then
this knowledge amounts to a complete bar to recovery for any injur-
ies suffered rather than merely being important evidence in favour
of the invitor. This was also the opinion of the court in Reid v.
Mimico' s where the plaintiff failed in an action for injuries sustained
15 (1956), 20 W.W.R. 246 (Sask.).
16 [1955] 3 D.L.R. 681 (Ont. C.A.).
17 [1951] A.C. 737 at p. 745.
'S (1926), 59 O.L.R. 579.
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when she tripped in a hole in the pavement, inasmuch as she was
aware of the existence of the hole. It should be noted, however, that
the warning of the nature and extent of the danger must be sufficient
to allow the invitee to estimate the risk involved.
Is there then no room in our law for contributory negligence in
relation to the occupier of property? According to Reid v. Mimico
there is not, the reason being that there is no general duty on the
occupier to keep his premises reasonably safe. He must only protect
invitees from damage from unusual danger and if he is negligent
in carrying out this duty, either by not repairing or by not giving
proper warning, then the injured customer recovers regardless of
any negligence on his own part. If, on the other hand, the shop-
keeper has fulfilled his duty then the customer who ignores the
warnings or protection offered is deemed to have acted unreasonably
and has no cause for action. This question was discussed in both
Whitehead v. North Vancouver'9 and Brown & Brown v. B. and F.
Theatres Ltd.20 In the latter case an opposite result was reached
and the plaintiff recovered damages in an amount reduced in pro-
portion to his own negligence. It must be stated, however, that there
a theatre patron had purchased an admission ticket, so that the
Brown case does not directly apply to the shopkeeper situation. It
was argued that the duty imposed in Indermaur v. Dames was de-
fined before The Negligence Act was instituted and should today be
altered accordingly. However, in the light of the persuasive decision
of London Graving Docks v. Horton2 ' which has been generally
adopted in Canada though not specifically in regard to this point,
there does not appear to be much room for the Negligence Act with
regard to contributory negligence in these cases.
The shopkeeper only incurs liability to the invitee within the
geographic limits of his invitation. If a customer should stray be-
yond the areas of the store open to customers, he will then become
a trespasser or, at best, a licensee. The shopkeeper may by his con-
duct extend the invitation beyond that normally extended to cus-
tomers. If so, the customer will then become an invitee to that part
of the store. In Rudlen v. Bridgeman,22 when the plaintiff asked if
there were any peas for sale, the clerk replied in the affirmative,
pointing to a shelf in a part of the store not normally frequented
by customers. While fetching the peas, the plaintiff fell through an
open trap-door; it was held that the conduct of the clerk was an
implied invitation to go to the shelf and, further, that the plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence in not seeing and avoiding
the open trap door when his eyes were raised to the shelf.
19 [1939) 3 D.L.R. 83 (B.C. C.A.).
20 [1947] 3 D.L.R. 593 (S.C.C.). Also, Greisman v. Gillingham, [1934)
S.C.R. 375.2ISupra, footnote 17.
22 [1930), 3 D.L.R. 224 (Ont.).
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Although the special obligation towards invitees exists only
while the visitor is physically present in that part of the premises
which the occupier has thrown open to the public, it extends to all
parts of the store which the visitor may reasonably expect are open
to him. Therefore if a telephone or other facility is provided and
maintained for the use of customers, the customer is an invitee
while he makes use of it.23 However, if such a convenience is main-
tained for the private use of the occupier and his employees, the
customer is at most a licensee if he should choose to take advantage
of the device.2
A final consideration in the storekeeper's role is that the duty
of the invitor applies to the occupier and not necessarily to the owner
of the premises. If the shopkeeper rents his store, he alone, and not
the landlord, is liable to the customer. Similarly, the duty is personal
in that the occupier may not delegate his responsibilities to his ser-
vants, agents or independent contractors to avoid liability.2
ALICIA FORGIE-
23 Clow v. Tracey, [1949] O.R. 827.24 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Randolph, 64 F. 2d. 247 (1933).2 5 Thomson v. Cremin & others, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1185.
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